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pAbstract
Technocratic Minister of Labor in an economic emergency, with the assignment to
devise two key reforms (pension system and labor market): a unique, though hard
experience for an academic, confirming the gap between economic research and
real life. This paper gives an account of the Italian labor market reform, an attempt to
reconcile economic logic, social expectations, requests from European institutions
and financial constraints. This reform survived difficult social dialogue and long
Parliamentary debates and had severe communication problems; resulting however
in a comprehensive law aiming at inclusion, dynamism and higher productivity and
representing a chance of better prospects for the young.
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Autumn 2011: Italy on the edge
On May 29th, 2013, the European Commission decided to end the “Infraction proced-
ure for excessive deficit” opened against Italy in 2009. As a member of Italy’s former
“technocratic” government, responsible for drafting two major laws–the Pension and
Labor Market reforms–I could finally draw a sigh of relief. Brussels’ decision showed
that the sacrifices the government had to impose on Italians in order to realize fiscal
consolidation were starting to pay off.
These as well as other reforms were the result of a sharp decline of the Italian sover-
eign debt credibility in Summer 2011, which brought the Country to the verge of a fi-
nancial crisis, with likely devastating consequences also for Europe and the Euro1. ItalyFornero; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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debt (over 130 per cent of GDP) and its well-tested system for doing so had come
under massive attack. Financial operators had turned their backs on debt auctions and
the few who took part were demanding exorbitant interest rates, so that the spread of
the interest rate of Italian 10-year bonds over their German counterparts rose to over
550 basis points. It is therefore not rhetorical to say that financial breakdown was
round the corner and that the possibility of unhonored sovereign debt was very real;
even pensions and civil service salaries were at risk. Central and local administrations
were already unable to pay suppliers, whose claims exceeded 70 billion Euros.
Many observers were pointing to the risk that Italy might become the “new Greece”
(Gammelin and Bachstein 2011 and Brummer 2011), with much worse consequences
on both economic and social stability inside the country and in the whole Euro area.
The worsening of the financial situation was, however, only one side of the coin. The
other was the structural weakness that has been afflicting the country for about twenty
years: growth rates have been significantly lower than elsewhere in Europe and productivity
has been either stagnant or declining. Industrial decline has slowly reduced Europe’s once
most buoyant economy to a shadow of its former self. Italy had cut its R&D expenditure,
got out of high productivity sectors like electronics, chemicals and drugs, and concentrated
instead on labor intensive fashion-oriented “made in Italy” products, where it has been
encountering increasingly stiff competition from developing countries.
Politics was at a stalemate. The government first had refused to recognize the gravity of the
situation and persisted in making unrealistic promises. In August 2011, however, it yielded to
international pressure and pledged to introduce wide-ranging changes (prominent among
them pension and labor market reforms), as urged by the ECB in a letter of August 5th.
It however could not survive the ensuing confusion among its own parliamentary sup-
porters, who disliked to take responsibility for unpopular restrictive measures. The govern-
ment resigned on November the 12th in a situation of political chaos and the President of
the Republic appointed Professor Mario Monti, a former member of the EU commission, as
head of a “technocratic” government, composed of experts drawn from civil society and with
no political affiliation. The new government received a vote of confidence (Nov 16th, 2011)
by a “strange” Parliamentary majority, composed of the two political parties (centre-left and
centre-right) who had been acrimoniously fighting each other for the past twenty years.Technocrats in power: a wealth tax and the pension reform in the “Rescue
Italy” package
The new Government had no time to waste, and little time to fine-tune the first emergency
measures. On November 16th the plea: “FATE PRESTO!” (Act immediately) was splashed
in capital letters on the front page of Il Sole 24Ore, Italy’s economic daily, reflecting a widely
shared sense of urgency. The two measures that were to be the core of the first govern-
ment bill (the so-called “Rescue Italy” decree) were a wealth tax and the pension
reform. The first was limited to property, as Italy lacks a reliable public register of
households’ financial assets2. Moreover, these are largely represented by Italian sovereign
bonds whose taxation would have more or less immediate repercussions on interest rates.
As minister of Labor, I was asked by President Monti to prepare an immediate re-
structuring of Italy’s pension system, one of the former government’s Summer promises
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sions for more than 20 years; CeRP, the research Center I set up in 1999 and directed
since, had conducted detailed research on the structure, growth and trends of Italian
pension debt. I was now given the task of reshaping the Italian pension system in less
than twenty days! The first lesson I learnt is the existence of a huge gap between ana-
lyzing a problem as a researcher and having to make, as a minister, decisions in an
emergency, on matters bound to have a very strong impact on my fellow-citizens’ life
perspectives and plans.
The reform had to stand up to the challenge, and thus not only to be very severe and
immediately effective, but also to appear credible to financial markets. It had to cancel
distortions still embedded in the system after twenty years of reasonable but exasperat-
ingly slow piecemeal reforms3 and provide for demographic transition while reducing
the burden on the young and future generations. Due to the financial emergency, there
was little time for social dialogue, parliamentary debate and the transition period that is
customary in pension reforms. The reform was submitted to Parliament as a Government
decree (and therefore approved with a vote of confidence) and was not preliminarily dis-
cussed with the social partners. This procedure, entirely due to the urgency imposed by
the crisis, created a wound in the relationships with the trade unions for which the
government paid a price in the subsequent labor market reform.
The reform did not introduce structural changes in the pension design–essentially a
“Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) system”–but had to be quite radical in its appli-
cation. It extended to all workers (including MPs), as of January 1st 2012, the
contribution-based method of calculating benefits; it raised the statutory retirement
ages and profoundly restructured the so-called seniority pensions, awarded, almost
irrespective of age, on the basis of years of work4; it aligned, as of 2018, the retirement
ages of women to those of men; it indexed all retirement requisites to changes in life
expectancy; it froze the indexation of pensions to prices for two years, excluding only
pensions up to 1400 Euros per month; it established a “solidarity contribution” on very
high pensions5.
As a result, according to an international evaluation (OECD 2013), the Italian pen-
sion system is now financially sustainable, although the extension of working life re-
quires additional measures to enhance the demand for older workers. Most Italian
families had to revise lifetime strategies in order to take account of the new, harsher
situation. It is a tribute to the Italian people that, although there were protests and vi-
cious personal attacks against the Minister6, the majority of citizens realized that these
sacrifices were necessary to clean up the country’s financial mess and there were no
general strikes and no major opposition, either in Parliament or in the streets.
The ensuing debate, however, almost disregarded what was perhaps the major achieve-
ment of the reform: a significant re-balancing, in favor of the young, of generational
relationships. Indeed the reform came after twenty years of pensions restructuring that,
for political reasons, had made the young pay a high price to the advantage of current and
elderly generations, in terms of a frustratingly slow transition towards the new regime.
The reform not only reduced the implicit pension debt7 but also challenged the “lump of
labor fallacy”, an undeclared basis of past pension legislation and still a frequent claim in
public debate, which accused the reform of reducing the number of jobs available to the
young by keeping older workers longer at work.
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much less commented upon, than the marked reduction of the spread that followed
the approval of the “Rescue Italy” decree. Taking the long view, however, the former
was possibly much more important. The inability to clearly convey this message of a
structural change in both the pension and the labor market reforms remains for me a
cause for regret and was certainly one of the shortcomings of government action.
Tackling structural labor problems: the search for a “good” equilibrium among
conflicting stakeholders
i) The starting pointIn spite of having being subjected to various reforms in the past two decades,
meant to reduce rigidities, smooth frictions and overcome segmentation and
ideological barriers, the labor market was still plagued, in 2011, by structural
shortcomings, distortions and flaws which the economic crisis had severely
worsened. Academic research as well as the analyses of international institutions8
has provided a stylized picture which unambiguously pointed to a rather inefficient
market, sharply segmented along the lines of cohorts, gender and geographical area.
Shortcomings, as described in the Additional file 1, were (and still are) mainly
structural, and not just the result of the crisis.
Market dualism, i.e. sharp separation between protected groups (mainly men, over
forty, in manufacturing and government jobs) and marginalized or excluded ones
(the young, women and older workers–see Additional file 1: Figure S1, S2) has been
caused by successive layers of legislation, which created rigidities, on one side, and
“bad” flexibility, i.e. precariousness (Additional file 1: Table S1, S2, S3), on the other.
Traditionally low participation rates, particularly among women (Additional file 1:
Figure S4) and older workers, have been largely determined by lack of care services,
often compelling women to choose between work and family, and by early retirement
provisions, motivated by restructuring of firms and often conceived, for women, as an
ex post compensating factor for their disadvantages in the labor market.
An unwarranted separation between school and work has been encouraged by
ideological prejudice, causing both insufficient vocational training and lack of adult
education (Additional file 1: Table S4, S5, S6).
Selective and discretionary social protection schemes, with prevalence of passive
policies (Additional file 1: Table S7) and poor or absent Active Labor Market
Policies (ALMP) have been stimulated by decentralization of employment services
to Regions, characterized by widely differing efficiency standards.
Finally, a comparatively high fiscal wedge weakened firms’ competitiveness
(Additional file 1: Table S8).
While present across the entire country, these inadequacies were (and still are)
particularly acute in the Southern Italy.
ii) Setting the objectives
With this picture in mind, the government first set the final objectives of the
reform, which were identified as promoting inclusiveness and dynamism in the
labor market. The task was thus to design an institutional framework capable of
guiding the evolution of the market along these lines.
Fornero IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 5 of 182013, 2:20
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/20We did not express the objectives in pre-determined figures, to be attained within a
strictly defined time frame. There was little foundation for this kind of precision,
which could have been interpreted as yet another political catchword. Instead, we
tried to indicate that the reform should stimulate changes in behavior, conducive to
better labor relationships and performance.
The attempt to realize an inclusive labor market implied a shift in policy emphasis
from jobs to workers and, in particular, from protecting jobs to protecting workers
in the market place along four major lines: i by enhancing their employability
through apprenticeship schemes, re-training and life-long learning programs, certifi-
cation of competences; ii by promoting more effective matching tools and quality
employment services; iii by establishing a more extensive safety net to substitute for
highly selective social protection schemes and iv by organizing reliable active
policies.
The attempt to realize a dynamic labor market implied a market with reduced
individual dismissal rigidities and shortened school-to-work and job-to-job
transitions, again to be realized by more effective active policies, a better
coordination between state and regional interventions and between public and
private providers of employment services.
The philosophy behind these changes, long advocated by international institutions
like the EU, the OECD and the IMF, is clearly in the realm of flexicurity: inclusion
and dynamism are the counterpart of “good” labor flexibility and should promote,
at least in the medium run, an increase in labor productivity and job opportunities.
iii)Were there feasible alternatives?
A first option would have been a much harsher modification of the various kinds of
contracts, possibly to be substituted by a “single open-ended contract” providing
little or no safeguards in the initial phase and then increasing protection throughout
the working life, according to the proposal by Boeri et al9. While trade unions
pressed for the reduction of the number of contracts, they strongly ostracized the
“single contract” for creating yet another vehicle by which market segmentation
between new entrants and workers already in force would have been enhanced, and
yet again to the disadvantage of the young.
A second option could have been represented by a sweeping deregulation of the
labor market, through additional deregulation of both temporary and independent
work and a more drastic cutback of restrictions on individual dismissals (De Nicola
2012). However sensible this could appear from an economic point of view (and I
have doubts that a labor market freed from binding norms would be a rational
choice, not to mention the social costs), it would not have been viable politically,
given the opposition by at least one of the trade unions (CGIL, the most
representative one) and by the party closest to it (the Democratic Party). In any
case, it would not have been the choice of this Minister, convinced as I am that
encouraging a reduction of labor costs through a progressive impoverishment of
labor relationships would have resulted mainly, if not solely, in an increase in casual
and precarious jobs. It could have saved some jobs in the short run, but it would
have resulted in further productivity decline. Indeed, it is exactly by improving the
quality of labor and by investing in human (as well as in physical capital) that
productivity and competitiveness can be increased.
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A serious communication difficulty arose almost at once. Both the media and
public opinion assumed that the reform would immediately increase the number of
jobs, by providing either a direct support to the demand for labor, through a
reduction of the "fiscal wedge" and thus of taxes and/or social contributions, or an
indirect one through some fiscal stimulus to aggregate demand. Budget constraints,
however, allowed neither of these measures, as the reform had to be implemented
at no additional cost for public finance, a provision that obviously severely limited
its possibility of having an immediate impact on demand.
It is also important to emphasize (in response to the complaints of various critics
about the long course along which the reform was set, particularly since Spain had
very swiftly approved a much more radical reform) that our path implied both
social dialogue and a thorough parliamentary debate. Indeed, while the pension
reform had been implemented through a government decree, for the labor market
reform the vehicle had to be (as explicitly requested by the President of the
Republic, the custodian and guarantor of the Constitution) a “design law”, subject
to a more democratic but also lengthier path, with the inevitable trade-off between
the need to compromise and the risk of having the reform rejected by Parliament.
I think it is fair to remind this to those critics who based their judgments on the
adherence of the reform to models, without considering that, in a democracy and
in non-emergency conditions, a law provision is inevitably the result of collective
action and can hardly be intellectually “pure” (assuming that such “pure” reforms
would do good to society).
Finally, the timing of the reform (which depended on previous commitments) was
adverse: trying to reduce abuses and to promote stability in a period of job scarcity
could seem a bizarre and self-defeating policy. However, a technocratic government
does not choose the timing of reforms, indeed, the opposite is true: it is called to
introduce reforms exactly when they are most needed and the political parties
cannot or will not do the job. What a technocratic government is supposed to do is to
search for a good equilibrium among the stakeholders’ conflicting interests as well as
between short and medium term objectives, which is exactly what we tried to achieve.A comprehensive reform resting on five pillars
The government attempted to create a “good” institutional environment, i.e. institutions
and procedures acceptable to both workers and employers whose cooperation would be in-
dispensable for success. It further sought to establish “good” rules, i.e. regulations that both
workers and employers could consider in their own interest, or in the interest of their chil-
dren, and translate into consistent behavior. All this required a thorough, large-scale reform
working on the different shortcomings of the labor market. The benchmark was the so-
called Hartz concept or Hartz reform, named after Peter Hartz, head of a commission
whose recommendations over the years, in particular in 2003-05, shaped the German labor
market reform (Tompson 2009 and Zimmermann 2013).
The Italian reform rests on five pillars: flexibility in labor market entry; flexibility in
labor market exit; social protection schemes; employment services and activation pol-
icies; follow up, monitoring and evaluation of the reform.
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With regard to labor market entry, the reform reduced the large number of existing
types of labor contracts with the twofold objective of preserving flexibility and of
limiting its improper use, conducive to badly paid, precarious and intermittent jobs
as well as to unfair competition both among workers and among firms. Non-
standard contracts concerning the so-called “atypical jobs”, and involving both
dependent workers (fixed term and part time labor contracts) and apparently
independent ones (project-related jobs, self-employed workers with only one client,
“associated” workers and interns) have been streamlined and revised with the aim
of reducing the ever expanding situations in which the worker is formally autono-
mous, although he/she is actually an employee.
Fixed term contracts, very popular among employers after liberalization (Sacchi 2013)
have been on the one hand further liberalized by exempting employers from having to
justify the temporary nature (up to one year10) of the first contract–or mission, when
provided by an agency. On the other hand, they have been made more costly than the
standard open-ended contract by levying an extra payroll tax of 1.4 per cent. This is a
way to internalize part of the costs that temporary contracts impose on both the
worker, who is more likely to become unemployed, and society, which is under the
moral obligation to provide both unemployment benefits and support in the search for
a new job. In case the contract is transformed into a permanent one, the equivalent of
six months’ extra contribution is given back to the firm11.
According to a widespread criticism the reform is against temporary jobs: they are
indeed welcome when they reflect the employer’s flexibility needs in order to
accommodate organizational or productive requirements. It is however strongly
reaffirmed that they cannot be a way to systematically transfer business risks from
employers to employees.
Other restrictions were introduced regarding agency workers, whose numbers had
shown an anomalous, rapid increase in previous years, clearly a substitute for more
protected contracts; and to so-called “associazioni in partecipazione”, a contract
under which workers are “associated” to the firm, providing human instead of
financial capital, and receive a profit related compensation, although their work is
entirely similar to that of normal employees. For more disadvantaged unemployed
people (older workers displaced by industrial restructuring and women in econom-
ically depressed areas) a bonus has been provided for the employer whatever the
contract, a substitute for a specific, subsidized contract.
In the permanent contract, apprenticeship is identified and strongly supported as
the main entry path into the labor market, with the aim of fostering, through
investment in education and vocational training, more skilled and productive
workers and more stable employment relationships. On the one hand, the allowed
ratio of apprentices to specialized workers has been increased (from 1 to 1 to 3 to
2); on the other, given that the contract is highly subsidized in terms of social
contributions12, an average stabilization rate of 30 per cent up to 2015, and 50 per cent
onwards, in the three preceding years is required in order to hire new apprentices.
ii) Second pillar
The counterpart of the effort to make the entry into the labor market less
haphazard is provided by the endeavor to reduce exit rigidities. The reform
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By modifying long standing and highly symbolic aspects of individual dismissal rules
and procedures, established in the “Statute of Workers’ Rights”, the reform aligned
Italy to European legal standards. More specifically, the provisions of article 18 of
the Statute–which applies to firms with more than 15 employees or more than 60
in case the firm has more than one plant–are relevant for those judicial cases in
which a court has declared the dismissal illegitimate, consequently deciding upon
the worker’s reinstatement even after various years since dismissal, with uncertain
but possibly very high costs for the firm.
It was a routine, not unfounded, complaint by employers that article 18 made
individual firing of workers almost impossible and that this was one of the motives
for lack of (especially foreign) investments in Italy (Procedures for collective
dismissals start from five workers and are activated through negotiations with the
trade unions.). On the other hand, article 18 was considered by workers and trade
unions an inalienable right, not even subject to a discussion.
The alteration of this article therefore involved much more than mere economic
efficiency considerations. Ex ante, this was perhaps the single issue on which the social
partners and the political parties were most radically divided. Ex post, changes are,
naturally enough, a compromise, but this does not lessen their innovative content when
all political and social constraints are taken into due consideration.
The revision is extensive, with the aim of promoting conciliation and discouraging
lawsuits, reducing their length (currently up to 6-7 years for the three levels of
judgment), limiting the uncertainty about the costs of firing for firms, without
restricting workers’ fundament rights. In order to achieve these goals, first, a
preliminary conciliation procedure has been made compulsory and, second,
different sanctions for illegitimate dismissals have been substituted for former
unified sanctions, which typically were identified in the worker’s reinstatement. On
the one hand, discriminatory dismissals (on the ground of race, gender or sexual
orientation etc.) continue obviously to be prohibited and thus become null after a
sentence has been delivered, so that the dismissal is regarded as if it had never
occurred. On the other hand, the reinstatement of workers illegitimately dismissed
for economic and disciplinary motives has been restricted to cases where the court
recognizes the manifest nonexistence of the motive. In all other cases, it is replaced
by a monetary compensation, ranging from 12 to 24 months of salary, depending
on the employee’s length of service and other criteria.
The time for a dismissed employee to sue the employer has been reduced from 330
to 240 days and a “fast” judicial track for lawsuits has been introduced.
Finally, two further provisions were introduced: a) an additional contribution for
dismissals to be paid by the employer, in order to make more transparent their
social cost to both the worker and society and b) a procedure to fight the practice
of fake resignation concealing dismissals (allegedly widespread and mostly used
against women13 and immigrant workers).
A comprehensive view of the first two pillars shows the underlying effort to hinder
market dualism and to enhance productivity mechanisms: entrance in the labor
markets had to be reinforced while the exit mechanisms had to be made less
prohibitive.
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Social protection schemes (i.e. passive labor policies) have been substantially
revised and, according to the “rights and duties” principle, steps have been
taken towards universality and pro-active behavior. Whereas past Italian
legislation was mainly focused on employment protection in the workplace,
the inspiring principle of the new law is to reinforce workers’ protection in
the labor market, through a more comprehensive and universal benefit which
will replace most of the existing diversified provisions. To this end, the
government sought to maintain and extend to all workers the Cassa
Integrazione Guadagni (CIG), i.e. the provision supporting workers laid off
in the downturn of the cycle. The scheme had previously worked well in sit-
uations of temporary lack of demand, but did not cover all workers and had
been rather arbitrarily extended over the years, becoming more discretionary
and frequently an instrument either to postpone unemployment (CIG for
restructuring or “in deroga”, i.e. unrelated to previous contributions) or to
provide a bridge towards early retirement (the so-called “mobility schemes”).
A succession of discretionary provisions could thus keep a worker on such
schemes for decades, without any serious attempt to requalify the worker
and help him/her find a new job.
A new social protection benefit–called ASpI (Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego,
i.e. Social Insurance for Employment)–has been introduced, lasting 12 months for
workers up to 55 years of age and 18 months from 55 onwards, which considerably
extends social protection coverage in terms of both recipients and expenditure. A
“mini-ASpI” also covers, at reduced rates, apprentices, short-term workers and
young people without much experience in the labor market, who were previously
excluded from any social protection provisions, for a period equal to half their
working period in the last 12 months.
The reform also established that access to benefits is contingent to the individual’s
willingness to be active in the labor market (i.e. by participating in re-training
courses) or to accept a job offer, at given conditions. In case of refusal–and this is a
rather radical departure from the past–the benefit is cancelled. Of course, to be
effective these ’stick and carrot” devices need very serious monitoring and imple-
mentation, which can be a problem in a country rather unfamiliar with active
policies and to contingent benefits.
iv) Fourth pillar
Effective activation policies and quality employment services are indeed a kind
of chimera in many Italian regions. The reform included an assignment for
future governments a) to lay down principles to redesign ALMP as well as
life-long learning provisions; b) to reshape the role of employment services by
restructuring their organization, stressing the importance of cost-effectiveness
analysis and of increased professionalism in job-centers; c) to realize, possibly
within a single agency, a better
coordination between passive and active labor market policies.
The government could not, however, accomplish its task because the Regions
deemed the government intervention ill-timed, because three of them were sched-
uled to have elections. Apart from leaving an important part of the reform
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Indeed, regional governments value subsidiarity very much and are not always ready
to give way, in order to realize a national level playing field for workers, so that
Southern workers could have access to employment services of the same
quality and quantity than those available in the Northern regions.
v) Fifth pillar
The law openly recognizes that reforms are not perfect intellectual products handed
down from above into an imperfect world. Rather they resemble fairly rough tools
that need regular monitoring, maintenance and adjustment, must be strengthened
where they are effective and corrected where they do not work or live up to
expectations; they must be tuned to social and economic evolution and also to non-
responsiveness by firms and workers. A permanent flow of data collected from vari-
ous administrative sources14, to be made freely available to the scientific community
for independent evaluation of the reform, has been officially started. A monitoring
process is under way and the new government has embraced the idea both as the
basis for scientific investigation and as the recognition of the principle that changes
must be introduced where necessary.
The labor market reform has also provided a chance to tackle the thorny problem
of greater inclusion of women in economic and social life, to fight the persistence
of discriminatory practices in the workplace and at the level of job protection. Con-
sequently, even within the stringency of tight financial constraints, the reform also
introduced specific provisions for women, whose participation to labor market is
one of the lowest in Europe (see Additional file 1: Figure S4). These include experi-
mental provisions, trying not only to make working life easier but also to strike a
better balance between private life and working life. With the aim of supporting
parenthood and of promoting a gender-balanced distribution of childcare within
families and of harmonizing the Italian legislation to the European Directives and
other countries’ provisions a mandatory paternal leave (sadly, very modest) has been
introduced consisting of a compulsory day leave in the first three month of the
child’s life plus two optional days to be shared between parents. Vouchers meant to
facilitate mothers’ work by easing their access to public and private childcare ser-
vices have also been introduced. Finally, as already mentioned, a provision trying to
prevent the practice of fake resignations, the so-called “dimissioni in bianco”, was
also included in the law.
Opposition, latent contradictions and political double standards
Overcoming ideological barriers and interest blocks
While rigorous economic analysis provides solid foundations for writing laws, it pays, per-
haps understandably, insufficient attention to the social and political dimensions of the
problem. Reforms are not usually born in a laboratory, by strictly following theoretical
models. In the real world, to get a comprehensive and thorny reform both approved by
Parliament and accepted by the population at large is a hard task: an economist turned min-
ister can hardly find comfort in the tools of the trade and stands alone in a strange territory.
Concern for social cohesion and political etiquette require, in Italy as well as in other
countries, that any important change involving socio-economic matters in general and
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pean countries, play an important, often decisive role in consensus building.
After the swift pension reform had become law, talks with trade unions and em-
ployers’ associations about the labor market reform started in early January 2012. Two
major obstacles soon became evident: lack of agreement among the social partners and
the pervasive presence of ideological elements in the discussion, coupled with the fear
of losing even small benefits or subsidies. These obstacles were at their highest in the
revision of article 18 of the Statute of Workers’ Rights and in the redrawing of the map
of social protection schemes.
Article 18 had become a banner for workers’ rights and for decades unions had
insisted that not a word of it must be changed. Three academics–professor Ezio Tarantelli,
an economist who had studied under the guidance of Franco Modigliani, and professor
Marco Biagi and Massimo D’Antona, two labor law experts–had been shot and killed by
terrorists for publicly advocating a profound revision of labor law, including article 18,
and for working on technical aspects of the changes. As much as I tried to play down the
discussion on article 18, claiming that there were many other important aspects of the
labor relationships that warranted careful considerations, public debate always heatedly fo-
cused on it. Moreover, unions and employers’ associations were completely at odds with
each other on this matter.
Somewhat surprisingly, the redrawing of social protection schemes instead found
both unions and employers strongly united against change. Both challenged the appro-
priateness of modifying such an important social institution right in the middle of a de-
pression, without considering, however, that a technocratic government does not
choose the time path of its mission and that there had been a precise commitment to
change by the previous government. The preference for the status quo–a clear case of a
suboptimal equilibrium, highly subsidized by the state, which none of the parties had a
real interest in changing–was demonstrated by the fact that a 1997 legislative decree,
empowering the government to introduce a reform without further recourse to Parlia-
ment had never been acted upon by any government15. Irrespective of all the inefficien-
cies and inequities in the system, it had always been considered that “letting sleeping
dogs lie” was the safer course.
In spite of this deeply rooted resistance to change, the first two months of negotia-
tions showed encouraging signs that a satisfactory agreement introducing non-cosmetic
changes could be reached. And this was essentially due to external conditions, another
factor that economists often tend to overlook when they talk about reforms, but which
were crucial in our case.
It was quite clear that European and international institutions supported the govern-
ment’s effort towards reforms and this positively influenced a significant fraction of the
population, which could see in the decline of the spread of the Italian sovereign debt
against its German equivalent a tangible sign of the country’s recovered reputation and
financial credibility. Indeed, this almost idyllic situation coincided with a substantial,
(although, alas, temporary) improvement in public finances, with public debt auctions
showing an unexpectedly high demand and a lowering of interest rates to 2010 levels.
The same favorable financial signs however soon combined with a worsening of the
negative trend of the real economy, where production and unemployment were both
moving just in the wrong direction, generating negative social and political repercussions
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dissatisfaction with “austerity” in general (and with the pension reform, in particular) and
started to erode consensus for the technocratic government and to make the political
forces that constituted the majority less sympathetic with our reform efforts.
So while the government received international support, the Italian debate got in-
creasingly stuck on article 18. CGIL, the largest and most conservative of the unions,
expressed skepticism and mistrust from the start, maintained an intransigent position
throughout the negotiations and ultimately refused to sign the final agreement between
the government and the social partners16.
CGIL discontent caused growing tensions inside the Democratic Party and led to the
government’s accepting a modification of the draft of the new article 18, allowing judges
to reinstate workers only in the case of “manifest non-existence” of the economic motive
as the cause for the dismissal. It so happened that what might appear (and in my opinion
is) a relatively small change produced significant negative repercussions: the Democratic
Party claimed that a “substantial” modification had been won thanks to the party’s political
pressure and this caused a sort of “snowball effect”. Both the social partners and the polit-
ical parties started to dissociate themselves from the bill, each of them asking for further
changes, to present as victories to their electorate or support group.
In the end, all partners and parties seemed very dissatisfied. Employers were unhappy
with what they considered excessive regulation of temporary jobs, insufficient freedom
to proceed with individual dismissals and inappropriate changes in social protection
schemes17. Precisely the opposite criticism came from the trade union side, which
branded the reform as too timid in fighting precarious job conditions, too harsh in re-
ducing guarantees against firing and untimely in modifying social protection schemes
during a recession. A sense of responsibility, however, prevailed and despite resentful
and rhetorical opposition (with declarations of a “never ending battle”), CGIL refrained
from calling massive general strikes against the change.
When the reform reached Parliament it not only had very few supporters, but the
general climate towards the government had changed18. Social and political forces were
immediately in action to modify the bill. Again, the international factor came to the
rescue: President Monti had to participate in an important meeting of the European
Council19, which prompted the government to ask for a vote of confidence, allowing
the law to be finally approved on June 28th20.The best possible equilibrium with an eye to European expectations
In the view of the government, and of the minister of Labor in particular, the reform rep-
resented the best possible equilibrium among too conflicting positions. I strongly believe
that, if properly applied, the reform will be able to provide the right framework for a more
efficient and more equitable functioning of the labor market by rebalancing opportunities
in favor of the young, improving productivity and the quality of labor relationships and by
reducing market dualism and segmentation. Unfortunately, communication difficulties,
implementation problems and absence of immediate results were at the root of wide-
spread criticism and, I must add, of unpleasant personal attacks.
The severity of the recession was one side of the coin. The other, however, was that
political parties had already started to think about the coming elections (due in Spring
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fessors”, but to make it a convenient scapegoat for all the long-term inadequacies of
the Italian economy. To give just one example, blame for the increase in the unemploy-
ment rate was immediately attributed to the reform, much before data could be collected
to confirm the claim and regardless of the fact that such reforms require perhaps years and
not months to produce effects (as the German experience with the Hartz reforms shows).
It so happened that the government came increasingly under attack by the same political
forces that had supported it in the first six months of its activity.Dynamic inconsistencies: short term effects and long term perspectives
Despite the first encouraging assessments from international institutions22, the dynamic
inconsistency between unmet short-run expectations (if not of rapid improvement, at
least of a stop in labor market deterioration) and better prospects for the medium-long
run created a short circuit: the technocratic government was increasingly seen not only
as “too theoretical”, too prone to abstract austerity per se, but also as responsible for all
that was wrong in the Italian economy and society.
When “all the chickens come home to roost”, basic cooperation between institutions,
social partners, political parties and the media is sorely needed, particularly in soberly
presenting the main issues. In the Italian case, however, the electoral campaign created
yet another occasion for sharp and vicious clashes among political forces and for dis-
torted presentations to citizens.
In this scenario, the message that reforms need to be endorsed by the various stake-
holders was lost. Yet, the ultimate success of a reform rests upon the changes in indi-
vidual and collective behavior that it can stimulate and support.
A year and a half after the law became operative, are we in a position to claim some-
thing more than just the standard rhetoric that “the direction was the right one”?
Apart from the relatively short period, the multiplicity of data sources and their
different timing has to be considered. Data on legal procedures concerning illegitimate dis-
missals, for example, are typically slower to appear than data on hiring and firing, available
through compulsory official notifications to the Ministry. As of November 2013, I am not
aware of any econometric study assessing the impact of the reform, while three “Monitoring
Reports” have been provided by ISFOL (a public research agency, under the supervision of
the Ministry), which enable us to examine preliminary evidence of the effects of the reform’s
first and second pillars, i.e. entrance in and exit from the labor market.
A first observation sadly concerns the sharp contraction of the number of the newly
hired (minus 10 per cent in the first quarter of 2013 compared to the first quarter of
2012). The recession hit the Italian economy very hard in 2012 (and in 2013), and this
obviously did not help the attempt of the reform to encourage apprenticeship and com-
bat precariousness in the short run.
A different structure of contracts for the newly hired, in tune with the reform, is
however clearly visible (ISFOL 2013a). Comparing (with seasonally adjusted data) the
second quarter of 2013 with the same quarter of 2012, the share of permanent con-
tracts slightly increased (from 16.8 to 17.5 per cent), as did (very slightly: from 2.6 to
2.8 per cent) that of apprenticeships and (more pronouncedly, from 62 per cent to 67
per cent) that of term contracts. The average length of temporary contracts also
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of very short term contracts (2-3 months) (ISFOL 2013b). On the other hand, the share of
“project-related jobs” (a kind of temporary contract tied to the realization of a specific
project) decreased from 8.2 to 6.7 per cent and that of agency jobs from 8.5 to 4.4 per cent,
while a sharp reduction occurred to the so-called “associazioni in partecipazione”23.
The evidence on apprenticeship is rather disappointing: the development of this im-
portant contract will require further work and a stronger coordination between schools,
firms and employment agencies.
As for exits from the labor market, very preliminary evidence suggests an increase in
dismissals and a reduction in resignations: the trends are likely to be interconnected, as
a result of the reform’s contrast of fake resignations on the one hand and the easier dis-
missal procedure on the other. Compulsory conciliation procedures have proved to be
rather successful, as about 40 per cent of the proposed conciliations in the first
7 months of the reform were agreed upon by the parties. A considerable number of dis-
putes could therefore be settled out of court. The length of legal dismissal procedures
has been reduced (Melis 2013).
Regarding “passive” policies, an improvement has occurred in the inclusion of workers in
the safety net. In response to the reform, new “solidarity funds”, financed by the social part-
ners, have been included in various collective agreements thus extending the traditional
CIG to previously excluded workers. The application of ASpI and mini-ASpI reduced the
number of employees excluded from all social protection schemes, with coverage including
almost all precarious (young) workers, such as apprentices and workers on term contracts.
Active policies, however, have made very little progress and cooperation with regional au-
thorities is getting off to a very slow start. A chance for (hopefully rapid) improvement will
be provided by the national implementation of the Youth Guarantee.Conclusion: Alice through the looking glass
As a final observation, a reflection on the advantages and disadvantages of a technocratic
government is appropriate. Such a government has both strengths and weaknesses with
respect to a political government. Points of strength include detachment from political
squabbles and greater possibility to be super partes, a very appropriate feature when, in a
stalled political scene, issues are structural, wide-ranging, highly technical and laden with
a high degree of urgency. A technocratic government can make choices for the medium-
long horizon rather than just for the short run, since its ministers are supposed to have a
more rigorous base for their choices, to be less–if at all–conditioned by prospective elec-
tions, as their own careers do not depend on their popularity with the electorate.
The weaknesses become apparent as soon as any of these points of strength wanes.
In particular, when a sense of urgency fades away because “disaster has been avoided”
or when, as was the case for Italy, the Prime Minister decides to step into the political
arena. Immediately the technocratic government becomes a lame duck: not a single
relevant law will be approved by a now restless Parliament. The technocratic govern-
ment will be judged for its achievements up to that very day; in the case of the Italian
experience, these included fundamental reforms that none of the two warring sides
would have had the courage to put forward. So it can well be said that the experience
was, on the whole, on the positive side but also that its demise was timely.
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economist turned technocratic minister feels very much in agreement with Alice in
Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass:
“Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If
you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that”.
To be effective, i.e. introduce tangible change, with the only comfort of an at best re-
luctant parliamentary majority, you must go beyond the rules of normal running and
somehow manage to run twice as fast.
Change can of course easily be reversed. Ink was not yet dry on the new pension and
labor laws when amendments started to be presented which would fundamentally alter
the logic of both laws. It is however a source of relief that, as months go by, opposition
seems to be abating in society at large: the new mechanisms are providing a more level
playing field for younger generations and some grudging recognition is taking the place
of passionate negation by those whose positional privileges are being eroded. The idea
that a reform is not an external deus ex machina but rather a "living organism" that has
to be nurtured and at the same time has to adapt to the outside environment without
losing its identity seems to receive some consent. The nation has become (very slightly)
wiser and more aware of its difficulties and complexities: we could perhaps say that we
left a (slightly) better country than we found.
This may seem overconfident, but I believe that the country made significant steps for-
ward towards the solutions of its structural problems. In pensions, it substantially reduced
its implicit pension debt; in labor law is now nearer to European standards. Both changes
represent a major rebalancing of opportunities in favor of younger generations. They are
to be seen as necessary, but not sufficient conditions. It is encouraging that the present
government talks not of overturning the reforms, but of using the “screwdriver” to fix
them, working on the monitoring and evaluation procedure of the reform.
Has all this been too harsh a medicine? In hindsight, no: had the message been less
clear and credible, the recent “green-light” from Brussels could never have come. This
green light is now both a sign of hope for Italian households and a warning to politi-
cians not to revert to bad old habits. With the end of the infraction procedure, our suc-
cessors’ hands are moderately freer. I wish them, and the country, the best success.
As an economist, can the technocratic minister be any wiser? Will her experience
alter the curriculum of her courses, the way she teaches, her attitude to research pro-
grams? The answer is a succession of “yes, but”. Economists have been denouncing
imbalances in the pension area for decades and issued stern warnings that went largely
unheeded; their approach to the modern labor markets was perhaps less unanimous
but policy implications in terms of flexicurity were largely shared; their reluctant dis-
position to dialogue with other social scientists has produced more harm than good.
It must be restated that economic models are and must remain the core of modern
economic thought. They however do not include all the relevant variables. In particular,
there is much work to be done in taking into account the influence of interest groups,
political parties, bureaucrats, judges and the media, as well as differences in regions,
age and skill. This I have learnt the hard way. So I am back in my University with a lot
to mull over and a lot of work to do.
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1See The Economist, July 14th, 2011.
2This tax (called IMU, Imposta Municipale Unica) was however cancelled by the new
government after the February 2013 general elections, in order to fulfill an electoral
promise made by the center-right party (the PDL), a member of the old governing
coalition.
3The most important one is the 1995 reform, which adopted the Defined Contribution
method of calculating benefits, allowing however for a very slow phasing in. The new for-
mula was applied entirely only to new entrants, partially (i.e. on a pro-rata mechanism) to
workers having less than eighteen years of seniority while elder workers with eighteen or
more years of seniority were excluded.
4Indeed, seniority pensions as such have been abolished as the system now contemplates,
in line with most European systems, only anticipated pensions (with penalization) and old
age pensions.
5This was later cancelled by the Constitutional Court, who considered the “solidarity
contribution” equivalent to an ordinary income tax, ignoring that the defined benefit
formulae on which those pensions were calculated implied a very loose connection, at
the individual level, between contributions and benefits, and thus realized a regressive
redistribution, favoring high income earners. Regrettably, this decision deprived the re-
form of one of its most noticeable traits of fairness.
6The attacks started in particular in connection to the problem of workers already
displaced from their job, or in a mobility scheme, in expectation of retiring within a
few years, or who had, at some point of their working life, voluntarily left their job
expecting pension laws to remain unchanged. The reform established a safeguarding
clause for 65,000 workers. It turned out later that the number was largely under-esti-
mated, because many individual and some collective agreements between workers and
employers had been concluded without any formal registration. Moreover, public opin-
ion refused to make distinctions inside this group – which the press called “Esodati”,
referring to a forced exodus from the labor market – and considered all of them as
equally deserving to be safeguarded, irrespective of the heterogeneity of their situations.
In a couple of subsequent provisions, the government added other 65,000, making a
total of 130,000 safeguarded workers.
7According to the official projections made by the Ragioneria Generale dello Stato
(the Central Government Budget Office, in charge of managing public accounts), the
net saving from the pension reform will amount to 80 billion euro in the decade 2012-
2021. See RGS(2012).
8See Del Boca and Rota (2008), Brugiavini (2009), Galasso (2010), OECD (2010),
OECD (2011). In a country report, the IMF (2011) states: “Policies should reduce labor
market dualism. […]The time-limited nature of temporary contract reduces incentives
for human capital investments and temporary employment creation tends to be in low-
skill areas. Also, the still high protection of permanent contracts continues to make it
difficult to lay off non-productive workers on permanent contracts. […]. Reforms to re-
balance employment protection—with a view to support job creation—by relaxing pro-
tection on regular workers while enhancing it for temporary workers would be beneficial
for reducing unemployment. Such reforms would create a more level playing-field for all
workers and enhance social cohesion”.
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for a more recent discussion.
10In the case the employer is an innovative start-up this period extends to four years.
11A subsequent change by the new government has extended this to one year.
12The rebate of social contributions is complete for the first three years for firms up
to 10 employees and partial (10 per cent instead of 33 per cent) for the others.
13In a 2008-09 survey (ISTAT 2011), 13.1 per cent for mothers born after 1973 indi-
cated that their employers ‘forced’ them to resign upon becoming mothers.
14The process involves various institutions such as: the Ministry of Labor, which col-
lects all the data on labor flows; INPS, the pension institute, which has all the adminis-
trative data on both workers and retirees; INAIL the institute for insurance against
labor accidents.
15In 1997, the Prodi government appointed a Commission, chaired by Prof Paolo
Onofri, to investigate the overall situation of social protection schemes with a view to a
comprehensive reform. In the Final Report (February 28th) the Commission wrote:
“The present structure of social protection is a fragmented, incoherent, unmanageable
collection of schemes, the result of successive overlapping norms creating unwarranted
and pervasive inequities at the expense of the weakest groups in term of political
representation”.
16Lack of understanding may have played a role in determining the trade unions’ an-
tagonism. Not being a politician or a trade unionist myself, I failed to realize how much
embedded in “rituals” negotiations still were. The trade unions particularly resented my
acceptance of an invitation from (more than 1000) workers of a large industrial plant
“to discuss with them”. They argued that it is not for the Minister to talk directly to
workers. Notwithstanding this difficult relationship, I always rejected the idea that an
agreement without the most left-wing of the trade unions, the CGIL, would have been
preferred by financial markets.
17Particularly harsh was the position of Confindustria, notwithstanding the fact that
their President had signed the agreement on which the law was subsequently written.
18The risk of the reform not being approved or being radically changed was clear to
the European Commissioner Laszlò Andor, who, in a parliamentary hearing, declared:
“the reform is necessary to increase employment, competitiveness and fairness; the pace
of the reform process has to be maintained and responsibility for a rapid approval lies
now in the hands of Parliament”.
19In this meeting (28-29 June, 2012) the European Council adopted the “Compact for
growth and jobs”.
20Law n. 92, June 28th, 2012 “New provisions for the Labor Market within a growth
perspective”, published in Gazzetta Ufficiale. n.153 July 3rd and effective since July
18th, 2012.
21Elections were then brought forward a couple of months, exactly due to the
worsening of the political situation and the withdrawal of support to the government
by the center right PDL party.
22See OECD (2013): “… over the past one-and-a-half years the government has taken a
series of measures to enhance the growth potential. These measures have mostly been in line
with previous OECD recommendations. They include reforms of the pension system, the tax
system, product markets, the labor market, the public administration, and the rule of law.”
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employed 1.260 workers, mostly women, as “associati in partecipazione”. The reform
introduced a ceiling of three “associates” for every firm. Through an agreement with
the trade unions, in July 2013 almost all workers were offered a permanent contract,
half of them as apprentices.
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